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Land is a key resource and its attribution is of vital economic and
political concern across societal groups in urban eastern Congo. Land
is not only important as a material resource; it is also woven into many
aspects of social life for Congo’s urban residents. Crucially, therefore,
possession of land is a key determinant of power in urban Congo.
Occupation and possession of land are important sources of prestige
and self-esteem, and contribute in no small way to determining people’s
social, economic, and political positions in society. Hence, land issues
relate to questions of property more broadly, and as such implicate
social, economic, and political power relations in the widest sense.
In a recent Congo Research Brief, we analyse the nexus between
property rights, land governance and land con icts in the Panzi
neighborhood of Bukavu, the provincial capital of South Kivu. Property
rights are notoriously precarious in Panzi, as they are in other urban
areas of eastern Congo, which has led exasperated Congolese citizens
to label the complex issue of property rights as “property anarchy,” or
“anarchic constructions”. In the brief, we argue that these references to
“anarchy” and “disorder” should not to be taken at face value. Instead,
they are produced through daily practices of land governance.
 Speci cally, we show that the phenomenon of “property anarchy” is not
the result of a spontaneous and chaotic process of urbanisation.
Instead they are to a large extent the result of a set of governance
practices deployed by land authorities in which the law—paradoxically—
is applied to ensure that the vast majority of people’s plots and
buildings do not comply with the law. Yet, other factors are also highly
important including rural-urban migration and residents self-governance
practices. Consequently, most Panzi residents’ property rights are
temporal and ephemeral. The disenfranchisement of people’s land
rights is upheld by a myriad of micro-practices of power, enacted by a
multitude of land authorities that compete and collaborate with each
other in unpredictable patterns. In order acquire a modicum of tenure
security, Panzi’s residents tend to either circumvent the law or play
along with the alternative rules imposed by the land authorities. In doing
so, they involuntarily become complicit in the “misrule of law”. Hence,
Bukavu’s property anarchy has become systemic and it affects poor
people and wealthy people alike, albeit to varying degrees.
Precarity and Property
Property rights are tenuous in Panzi for various reasons. First, the law
stipulates that land can be reclaimed by the state if doing so is in the
interest of the state. This means that land can be legally expropriated
on the basis of the state’s supreme authority. Second, Panzi is a poor
neighborhood in which the majority of the population live below the
global poverty line and cannot afford to acquire an o cial title deed.
Instead, many people have alternative documents to try to protect their
property issued by other statutory institutions. However, the most
frequently owned document that people use to secure their property is
the acte de vente (bill of sale). People in Panzi are mostly aware that
the bill of sale is not enough to grant them full legal (alienable) property
rights, but it is, nonetheless, used as a valid land title in transactions in
Panzi. Many people seem resigned to accept that the bill of sale is as
good as it gets in terms of securing their property rights.
Public Authority and Rent-seeking
Land governance in Panzi makes residents vulnerable to rent-seeking by
land authorities. The high value of land in Bukavu means that it is a
highly pro table sector of public administration as authorities  ne
people to pay for their transgressing of the law. State o cials carry out
missions in Bukavu’s neighbourhoods seeking transgressions to issue
 nes for, or fees for issue they may solve. It is easy to  nd plots and
constructions in Panzi that do not comply with regulations. Due to the
high density of housing and people, Panzi residents often build on sites
that are un t for construction, transgress boundaries of easements and
public space, or redirect overland sewers to make space for their
buildings.
Bukavu’s system of land governance
produces an unequal social structure where
people’s economic assets and the relative
power of their social relations strongly
condition their access to land and their
property rights.
Land Con icts and Connections
A high frequency of land con icts is one of the consequences of Panzi’s
“property anarchy” and the majority of these land con icts are over plot
boundaries. Other frequent forms of land con icts relate to the
channeling of waterways and sewage, the blocking of public
passageways, and inheritance con icts.
Panzi residents are not equally exposed to the same treatment by land
authorities’ rent-seeking in Bukavu. They are also not equally likely to
have a satisfactory outcome in a land con ict either. The wealthiest
people are able to buy a valid title deed. This is usually enough to
protect them against expropriation and encroaching neighbours or
competing claims to the plot in the case of multiple claimants.
Moreover, with su cient  nancial means, one can pay soldiers to
protect one’s property. Another effective way to protect one’s property is
through in uence peddling or using one’s parapluie (umbrella). In other
words, people’s social and economic position in society, as re ected in
the economic resources and social relations they are able to mobilise,
are the main factors shaping the degree to which their property rights
are recognised and sheltered.
Hence, Bukavu’s system of land governance produces an unequal social
structure where people’s economic assets and the relative power of
their social relations strongly condition their access to land and their
property rights. People’s property rights are withheld from them with the
aim of generating resources for the land authorities. This means that
land authorities use the law as an instrument to keep people in a
situation of permanent illegality, which makes the latter vulnerable to
extortion. Hence, when Panzi’s land authorities mobilise the law, they do
not typically do so to bring people in compliance with it. Instead, they
use it as an instrument to threaten residents into negotiating a
transgression fee or  ne. In this way, Panzi residents are able to acquire
a kind of temporary right to break the law. In Bukavu, money can buy a
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person a plot, a house, and the necessary documents to render the
acquired property legal. However, in order to truly enjoy secure property
rights you also need protection from powerful individuals capable of
enforcing them. This makes it almost impossible for all but the
wealthiest and well-connected to possess perennial property rights in
Bukavu. However, even they can become victims by this system of land
governance and its effects if they enter into con ict with other elites.
 
Beyond Anarchy: “Justice a deux vitesses”
Conventionally, anarchy is associated with violence and crime. Yet, our
brief suggests that Bukavu’s “property anarchy” is not anarchic in the
conventional sense of the word. Rather, illegality is produced through
the daily practices of land governance. The problem with framing the
nexus between property, con ict, and land governance as anarchic in
the conventional sense of the term is that it conjures up a dichotomous
understanding of legality and illegality. However, in practice, the law
does not operate in this way. Neither the law nor anarchy refers to
objective universal states of being, or domains of actions. Instead, the
boundary between the two is drawn through concrete power struggles.
Thus, when such distinctions are evoked, we must understand them as
attempts by different groups or individuals (more or less coordinated)
to establish, maintain, or disturb a certain political order and the
distribution of power and wealth that it protects.
What is at stake in the nexus between land governance, con ict, and
property rights in Panzi is who has the right and ability to de ne and
impose limits between illegality and legality, even at the micro-level
between neighbours. What counts as legal is not predominantly
determined by the law, but rather through struggles to de ne or impose
a certain de nition of “anarchy-order.” This means that people’s property
rights and the outcomes of land con icts are determined by the total
political, social, legal, coercive, and  nancial resources that they can
muster. This condition of “anarchy-order” has been dubbed locally as
“justice à deux vitesses” meaning that justice is rendered differently
according to who you are, who you know, and what you are worth.
Therefore, in order to understand why most of Panzi plots and buildings
are illegal—that is, do not conform to the rules of the law—it would be
misleading to resort to stereotypical notions of anarchy. Rather, what
needs to be understood and answered is how notions of anarchy and
order are employed, and in whose interest.
Read more on Constructed Anarchy: Governance, Con ict, and
Precarious Property Rights in Bukavu, Democratic Republic of the
Congo.
Note: The CRP blogs gives the views of the author, not the position of
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